

HISTORY

9389/32

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

October/November 2015

1 hour

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

This paper contains **three** sections:

Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939

Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust

Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–50

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The marks are given in brackets [] at the end of each question.

This document consists of **4** printed pages and **4** blank pages.

Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

- 1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Britain became the first, and for a while virtually the only, manufacturing capitalist economy in the world. It was this that powered its world-wide expansion in the nineteenth century, far ahead of all its rivals; and also distinguished that expansion – or ‘imperialism’ if it had to be called that – from all previous ones. Those were imperialisms of conquest. Britain’s was one of settlement and trade. Its main agents were not the British state, but individuals and private companies. It seemed ‘natural’ not forced. This was less of an empire in the old and literal sense of the word – a centrally directed empire – than most others. This was why less imperial power adhered to the metropole than in those cases, and so much more to the colonists themselves.

This is not to seek to deny or minimise the imperialism that emanated from Britain in any way. The colonists were British subjects, in nominally British territories, and under the ultimate protection of British arms, which made them the British government’s responsibility. The latter should have kept them on a tighter rein. That it did not do so was a matter of choice, not necessity. The motive was to save the cost, both human and financial, of policing them properly. Behind that was the spirit of nineteenth-century Britain that all government should be kept to a minimum, in order to allow enterprise to thrive – the sort of enterprise that had created the colonies in the first place. However, non-imperialism was not an option. In a world full of vacuums, the phenomenon of stronger peoples exploiting and oppressing weaker ones was inevitable. State imperialism was only a part of this, and as often working *against* the colonial sort, to try and rein it in, as with it. This demonstrates some of the varieties of imperialism that co-existed, some of which seemed inconsistent with each other.

Imperialism, as it worked out in practice, was not primarily an ideological or cultural phenomenon, but a material one. People did not go colonising because of any ideas they may have had about glorifying Britain, for example; or bettering the world; or about the superiority of their ‘race’ or religion. They did it because they were able to (the vacuum); and – mainly – to better themselves, usually in material terms.

Of course, the effect of culture was not negligible. If it had little bearing on whether or not Britain was to be imperialistic, it certainly had an effect on the way her imperialism was regarded at home. Most such cultural influences were not imperialistic intrinsically; they sprang from other roots. Capitalism was one, creating as it did a system of values that was bound to make British imperialism more mercenary in flavour than others; but also, at the same time, contributing towards certain people’s resistance against the idea of British imperialism; and secondly, provoking in other quarters the *anti*-capitalist reaction that had a considerable influence (‘paternalism’) on the way the empire was ruled. Other domestic cultural traits that impacted almost as greatly were liberalism, utilitarianism, class, evangelical Christianity and the doctrine of ‘progress’. Some of these were drawn in to justify imperialism, after the (material) event. Culture coloured British imperialism, but was not responsible for it, or significantly affected by it.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2**The Holocaust**

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

It was no accident that the war in the east led to genocide. The ideological objective of eradicating 'Jewish-Bolshevism' was central, not peripheral, to what had been deliberately designed as a 'war of annihilation'. It was inseparably bound up with the military campaign. With the murderous onslaught of the Einsatzgruppen, backed by the Wehrmacht, launched in the first days of the invasion, the genocidal character of the conflict was already established. It would rapidly develop into an all-out genocidal programme, the like of which the world had never seen.

Hitler spoke a good deal during the summer and autumn of 1941 to his close entourage in the most brutal terms imaginable about his ideological aims in crushing the Soviet Union. During the same months, he also spoke on numerous occasions in his monologues in the Führer Headquarters – though invariably in barbaric generalisations – about the Jews. These were the months in which, out of the contradictions and lack of clarity of anti-Jewish policy, a programme to kill all the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe began to take concrete shape.

In contrast to military affairs, where his repeated interference reflected his constant preoccupation with tactical minutiae and his distrust of the army professionals, Hitler's involvement in ideological matters was less frequent and less direct. Hitler had laid down the guidelines in March 1941. He needed to do little more. Once lit, the genocidal fires would automatically rage into a mighty conflagration amid the barbarism of the war to destroy 'Jewish-Bolshevism'. When it came to ideological aims, in contrast to military matters, Hitler had no need to worry that the 'professionals' would let him down. He could rest assured that Himmler and Heydrich, above all, would leave no stone unturned in eliminating the ideological enemy once and for all. And he could be equally certain that they would find willing helpers at all levels among the masters of the new Empire in the east, whether these belonged to the Party, the police, or the civilian bureaucracy.

Just as, from autumn 1939 onwards until his 'halt order' of August 1941, he had seen no need to involve himself in the 'euthanasia action' any further, once he had authorised its commencement, so now he would see no cause to participate in the daily business of the dirty work of genocide. That was neither his style, nor his inclination. Organisation, planning and execution could confidently be left to others. There was no shortage of those keen to 'carry out practical work for our Führer'. It was sufficient that his authorisation for the major steps was provided; and that he could take for granted that, with regard to the 'Jewish Question', his 'prophecy' of 1939 was being fulfilled.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

From the closing days of the Second World War, American defence officials believed that they could not allow any prospective adversary to control the Europe/Asia land mass. Strategic thinkers and military analysts insisted that any power or powers attempting to dominate in Europe or Asia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States. Post-war assessments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasised the importance of deterring further Soviet aggrandisement anywhere in Eurasia. Defence officials hoped to avoid an open rift with the Soviet Union. But at the same time they were determined to prevent Eurasia from falling under Soviet and Communist influence.

Studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that, if Eurasia came under Soviet domination, either through military conquest or political and economic ‘assimilation,’ America’s only potential adversary would acquire enormous natural resources, industrial potential, and manpower. By the autumn of 1945, military planners already were worrying that Soviet control over much of Eastern Europe and its raw materials would permit Russia’s economic recovery, enhance its war-making capacity, and deny important foodstuffs, oil and minerals to Western Europe. By the early months of 1946, Secretary for War Patterson believed that Soviet control of the Ruhr-Rhineland industrial complex would constitute an extreme threat. Even more dangerous was the prospect of Soviet predominance over the rest of Western Europe, especially France. Strategically, this would undermine the impact of any prospective American naval blockade and would allow Soviet military planners to achieve defence in depth. The latter possibility had enormous military significance, because American war plans relied so heavily on air power and strategic bombing, the effectiveness of which might be reduced substantially if the Soviets acquired outlying bases in Western Europe and the Middle East or if they ‘neutralised’ bases in Great Britain.

Economic considerations also made defence officials determined to retain American access to Eurasia, as well as to deny Soviet predominance over it. Long-term American prosperity required open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much – if not all – of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines. In late 1944 and 1945, the US was protesting against the proposed industrial weakening of Germany, lest it undermine American economic well-being, set back recovery throughout Europe, and unleash forces of anarchy and revolution. A report prepared by the staff of the Moscow embassy and revised in mid-1946 emphasised that ‘Soviet power is by nature so jealous that it has already operated to segregate from the world economy almost all of the areas in which it has established itself.’ American economic interests in Eurasia were not limited to Western Europe, Germany, and the Middle East. Military planners and intelligence officers in both the army and navy expressed considerable interest in the raw materials of Southeast Asia, wanted to maintain access to those resources, and sought to deny them to a prospective enemy.

While civilian officials and military strategists feared the loss of Eurasia, they did not expect the Soviet Union to attempt its military conquest. There was nearly universal agreement that the Soviets, while eager to expand their influence, desired to avoid a military engagement. In October 1945 the Joint Intelligence Staff predicted that the Soviet Union would seek to avoid war for five to ten years. In September 1947, the CIA concluded that the Soviets would not seek to conquer Western Europe for several reasons: they would recognise their inability to control hostile populations; they would fear triggering a war with the United States that could not be won; and they would prefer to gain hegemony by political and economic means.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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